Page 49335: (center column, last paragraph), the DOJ calls out the US Supreme Court case law, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003),
In Smith v. Doe, , the Court stated, “The Court of Appeals reasoned that the requirement of periodic updates imposed an affirmative disability. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals was under a misapprehension, albeit one created by the State itself during the argument below, that the offender had to update the registry in person. Id., at 984, n. 4. The State’s representation was erroneous. The Alaska statute, on its face, does not require these updates to be made in person. And, as respondents conceded at the oral argument before us, the record contains no indication that an in-person appearance requirement has been imposed on any sex offender subject to the Act.”
However, 3 years later in 2006, the federal code made the requirement “update the registry in person” imposed, stating in 34 U.S. Code § 20918, “Periodic in person verification A sex offender shall appear in person, allow the jurisdiction to take a current photograph, and verify the information in each registry in which that offender is required to be registered not less frequently than— (1) each year, if the offender is a tier I sex offender; (2) every 6 months, if the offender is a tier II sex offender; and (3) every 3 months, if the offender is a tier III sex offender. (Pub. L. 109–248, title I, § 116, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 595.) ”
The 2003 Court relied on the fact that no in person verification was required that would have demonstrated an “affirmative disability”. But Federal law did add an in person verification requirement 3 years later. So the question is: would the Court now admit, because there is an in-person requirement that 34 U.S. Code § 20918 can be now considered an affirmative disability, affirmative, meaning an active act to appear rather than to verify by other passive, non-affirmative means?
And if so, the Court would say, that because there now is an in person requirement, which is deemed as an unconstitutional affirmative disability, then that specific part of the registration statute is unconstitutional, and therefore 34 U.S. Code § 20918 must be removed.
Obviously the critical purpose for in person verification is for photographs and fingerprints. Removing that certainly compromises the efficacy of registration, too bad, it goes to the overall punitive unconstitutional nature of the stature as the 3 dissenting opinions of the Court had determined.
The matter above qualifies as a civil case I may present in Federal court.